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SEXUAL

DISCRIMINATION: PREGNANCY BENEFITS AS
INTERPRETED BY THE EEOC AND THE COuRTS-Wetzel v. Liberty
Mutual, 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted 95 S.Ct. 1989 (1975).*
Illness and disability are two of the major problems facing the
over 86,000,000 men and women, sixteen years of age and older, who
comprise today's total labor force in the United States.' Due to the
extreme probability that one of these misfortunes will strike at some
point in their working careers, workers, in considering job positions
with different organizations, are demanding some type of security
to insulate them from the financial consequences of long-term illnesses and on-the-job injuries. In an effort to meet these demands,
employers have devised and instituted various insurance and disability plans. A typical plan will more often than not be financed by
both employer and employee contributions. While the plans themselves are fairly comprehensive in scope, they frequently exclude
from coverage certain stated disabilities, e.g., alcoholism, suicide
and drug addiction.
In addition to these exclusions, a large number of insurance
plans also disallow compensation for disabilities due to pregnancy
and related causes, although companies normally allow pregnant
employees to take leaves of absence.2 In recent years these practices
have come under attack. While employers are not compelled by law
to provide disability plans, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
provides that once these plans are established they cannot treat
similarly situated employees differently.
*

The Supreme Court has vacated the judgment of the court of appeals with instruc-

tions to dismiss the appeal. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 96 S. Ct. 1202 (1976).
The Court held, on its own motion, that because the district court had not finally disposed
of any of Wetzel's prayers for relief, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear Liberty
Mutual's appeal. The issue presented in Wetzel still has relevance, however, in that Wetzel's
companion case, Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
423 U.S. 822 (1975), has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court.
1. Bureau of Statistics, annual averages for 1974: 33,417,000 women and 52,519,000
men. WORLD ALMANAC BOOK OF FACTS of 1976 (1975).
2. Prior to Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), noted in 23 DRAKE
L. REV. 690 (1974), some employers imposed mandatory termination dates on pregnant employees. In LaFleur, the Supreme Court held that arbitrary termination regulations violated
the due process clause.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(Supp. III, 1973),
amending 42 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1964):
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
established by the Act 4 and authorized to enforce Title VII,5 has
drafted guidelines which specifically state that pregnancy-related
disabilities are temporary disabilities for all job-related purposes
and should be treated as such under any temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.'
Although Title VII and the EEOC's guidelines appear dispositive of
the situation, there are several underlying issues which have given
rise to a considerable amount of litigation.
In light of the recent Supreme Court decision, Geduldig v.
Aiello (holding that a California state insurance program, by its
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities, did not discriminate on
the basis of sex in violation of the equal protection clause), 7 an
obstacle, if not an insurmountable barrier, blocks the total effectiveness of Title VII and its interpretative guidelines. The legality of the
guidelines has also been put into question since, arguably, the
EEOC did not follow the standards and limitations set forth by the
Administrative Procedure Act s as required by Title VII. The guidelines also represent, it has been argued, a position contrary to the
EEOC's former stance when employers were informed that they
were not compelled to include pregnancy-related disabilities in their
plans. 10
Despite the apparent strength of these arguments, an overwhelming number of cases, both before and after Geduldig, have
followed the EEOC interpretation by holding that mandatory termination dates for pregnant employees and the exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities from benefit plans do violate Title
VII.11 In recognition of this conflict, the United States Supreme
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. III, 1973).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
6. 29 C.F.R. 1604.10(b) (1975): Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy,
miscarriage, abortion. . .are, for job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be
treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.
7. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970). See discussion of this issue p. 204 infra.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
10. Several companies, in attacking the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, have contended that pregnancy is a voluntary condition and therefore is outside the scope of a disability and illness plan; that since pregnancy is a uniquely female condition, exclusionary plans
do not discriminate in favor of men; and that the coverage of these disabilities would be so
extraordinarily expensive that the primary purpose of the plans, i.e., minimal cost to employees, would be defeated. See p. 207 infra.
11. See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 36 (1975) (argued Jan. 19, 1976); Communications Workers of America v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651 (8th
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Court recently granted certiorari to two cases involving this issue:
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co."2 and Gilbert v. General
Electric Co." The scope of this note will be limited to a discussion

of the rationale and impact of the Wetzel decision.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF WETZEL

Two named plaintiffs, Sandra Wetzel and Mari Ross, commenced a Title VII class action in February, 1972, challenging their
employer's (Liberty Mutual Insurance Company) hiring and promotional practices, its pregnancy-related disabilities policy, and its
practice of providing disparate compensation for certain labelled
jobs. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania entered partial summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs on the issue of liability. 4 Liberty Mutual filed two appeals, one regarding its hiring and promotional practices and the
class action aspects of the case, and the other regarding its disability
plan concerning pregnancy." The lower court's judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in two separate opinions. The issue presently before the Supreme
Court is whether a private employer's exclusion of pregnancyCir. 1975); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975); Farkas
v. South W. City School Dist., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974).
Contra, Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Ind. School Dist. No. 16, 387 F. Supp. 1168
(D.Minn. 1974); Newmon v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1973); Godwin v.
Patterson, 363 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
12. 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1989 (1975).
13. 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975).
14. 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Plaintiffs were notified by letters of February
15, 1972, of their right to institute this action pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2601.25a(c) (1975)
(Rules and Regulations of the EEOC).
15. Liberty Mutual's policy may be instructive as a typical plan. It provided a contributory disability insurance program (Income Protection Plan) to which its employees must
subscribe as a condition of employment. This plan is considered a fringe benefit and provides
employees with the payment of income during periods of disability. With the exception of
disabilities resulting from acts of war and intentionally self-inflicted injuries, only disabilities
due to or related to pregnancy are excluded from coverage. Supplementary salary benefits
are also paid by Liberty Mutual. In cases covered by the Income Protection Plan, the company will pay an employee's full salary for the first week of disability, thereafter paying one
half the difference between full salary and insurance benefits, for as many weeks as the
employee has completed years of service. Because pregnancy-related disabilities are not covered by the first plan, the pregnant employee is not eligible for the supplementary salary
benefits. In cases of long term illnesses due to pregnancy where a physician is consulted, an
employee's supervisor has the discretion to consider the first five days of such absences
compensable under the company's short term absence policy. A different more liberal short
term plan applies to all other disabilities.
16. 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2415 (1975) determined the appeal
regarding hiring and promotion practices and the applicability of a class action; 511 F.2d 199
(3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1989 (1975) determined the pregnancy exclusion issue.
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related disabilities from its income protection plan constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.
II.

THE RATIONALES OF WETZEL AND GEDULDIG-A COMPARISON

Liberty Mutual contended that Geduldig was dispositive of this
issue. The Third Circuit in Wetzel, however, distinguished the two
cases in a comprehensive analysis. The court held that Wetzel involved a Title VII claim requiring a statutory interpretation while
Geduldig dealt with an equal protection claim calling for a constitutional analysis.
A.

Use of the Rational Basis Test

The majority of the Supreme Court in Geduldig, relying on
Dandridge v. Williams,'7 implemented a rational basis test in order
to conclude that California had a legitimate interest in maintaining
a self-supporting disability plan at a low rate of employee contribution despite the plaintiffs' desire for a more inclusive plan to cover
pregnancy disabilities. After a finding that increasing the plan's
scope would inevitably require a state subsidy, a higher rate of
contribution, or a lower scale of benefits, the Coutt held that, absent
a showing of invidious discrimination on the basis of sex, the Constitution does not require a state to subordinate its legitimate interest
solely to create a more comprehensive social insurance program.18 In
so holding, the Court affirmed its earlier position that legislatures
are permitted to take "one step at a time" when attacking social
problems."
By contrast, implicit in the Wetzel court's argument is the
theory that a rational basis test cannot be utilized in the determination of Title VII claims. It has long been recognized that legislatures
have a wide range of discretion in creating classifications and that
the constitutionality of these classifications will be upheld provided
they are not arbitrary.2 0 To circumscribe the possibility that discriminatory employment practices may be granted favorable presumptions, Congress enacted Title VII to assure equality of employ17. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
18. 417 U.S. at 496.
19. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535 (1972); these cases specifically stress the fact that they deal with social welfare
legislation.
20. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), rehearingdenied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
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ment opportunities" and directed the thrust of the Act toward the
consequences of employment practices.22 Where the plaintiff alleges
a constitutional violation and does not belong to a group which has
been categorized a "suspect classification"2 (s)he must overcome
the presumption of constitutionality and demonstrate invidious discrimination. 4 A Title VII plaintiff, however, need only show membership in a statutorily protected group (e.g., sex, race) and an
adverse effect of an employment practice on that class in order to
shift to the employer the burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the practice in question.
The burdens of proof alone demonstrate the consequences of
implementing the different standards. 5 The defendant in a Title VII
action cannot rely on generalizations and stereotypes in support of
its exclusion, 2 for Title VII "represents a flat and absolute prohibi7
tion against all sex discrimination in conditions of employment,"
and this requires consideration of individual characteristics. While
the requisite proof of invidious discrimination in constitutional
challenges implies a necessity for proof of intentional discrimination,2" no such burden is imposed on the Title VII plaintiff. Rather,
since policies under scrutiny in Title VII actions carry no such presumption of validity, it would be more correct to say that they are
presumed invalid if they have a disparate effect on a group protected under the statute.
Although maintaining separate tests for validity, i.e., one for
constitutional claims and another for Title VII claims, appears to
be anomalous when the same subject matter is involved, there is
legitimate support for this approach when dealing with sexual discrimination. The fourteenth amendment was originally treated as
21. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Sex has not been so designated despite recent leanings in that direction, as demonstrated by Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
24. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, note 7 supra.
25. E.g., in the area of racial discrimination recent Supreme Court cases indicate that
for a classification to violate the equal protection clause, it must involve race on its face, while
a showing of discriminatory impact is sufficient to show a Title VII violation: compare Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Justice Marshall, concurring).
27. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2; there is one exception to this absolute prohibition: the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1975).
28. Zichy v. City of Philadelphia, 9 CCH E.P.D.
10,211 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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a specific constitutional weapon against racial discrimination."
Despite recent trends towards demanding stricter scrutiny towards
sex classification,3" the rational basis test is still employed." Section
5 of the fourteenth amendment 3 and the commerce clause, 33 however, form a sound constitutional basis for Congress' enactment of
legislation mandating a stricter standard in cases of sexual discrimination in employment.3 4 By-passing the traditional method of
awaiting decisional law to interpret the Constitution in relation to
sex discrimination, Congress can, under its broad commerce powers,'3 regulate conduct which does not violate the express terms and
purposes of the fourteenth amendment. 36 Using this argument, the
Supreme Court could affirm the Third Circuit's decision in Wetzel,
without retreating from its Geduldig position.
B.

FactualDistinction

Although the Wetzel court indicated that the distinction between statutory interpretation and constitutional analysis alone was
sufficient to dispel reliance on Geduldig, it elaborated on the factual
differences between the two cases. 37 The California insurance plan
in Geduldig was totally supported by deductions from the wages of
participating employees. Each employee, unless protected by a voluntary private plan approved by the state, was required to contribute one percent of his/her salary up to an annual maximum. 3S The
Supreme Court relied heavily on the financial consequences the
state would encounter should pregnancy be included. With these
29. See, e.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
30. Reed v. Reed, note 23 supra; Frontierov. Richardson, note 23 supra.
31. Geduldig v. Aiello, note 7 supra.
32. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. The first post-Geduldig case that declined to extend Geduldig to Title VII actions,
Vineyard v. Hollister School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974), utilized this argument to
justify its decision; but see United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70,
73 (4th Cir. 1973).
35. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
36. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971). The advance notices of the proceedings at Wetzel's oral argument show that Mr.
Justice Rehnquist seemed concerned that Liberty Mutual appeared to be contending that
Congress could go no further than the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment in declaring
particular actions unconstitutional. The Supreme Court resolved this question long ago in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) holding inter alia that Congress' power
is not limited to situations where the judiciary has already acted for § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment gives Congress enforcement powers. See 44 U.S.L.W. 3421 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1976).
37. 511 F.2d at 203.
38. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 487 (1974).
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considerations to contend with, the Court proceeded to balance the
interests in compliance with the rational basis test. In contrast,
Liberty Mutual's plan derives its funds from both employee and
employer; therefore the maintenance cost could be spread over a
wider area without overburdening any one source. The Third Circuit
concluded that the two plans could not be compared and that the
balancing test was inapplicable."
Because the Geduldig decision rested primarily on the cost of
the plan, the Wetzel panel could have drawn a further distinction.
The EEOC has determined that it is not a defense "to a charge of
sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is
greater with respect to one sex than the other."40 In addition, Liberty Mutual excluded disabilities resulting from all pregnancyrelated conditions while the California plan- excluded only the disabilities resulting from normal pregnancy.4 The court could have
added the distinction that the plan in Geduldig was a legislative
classification, entitled to greater deference than a classification
drafted by a private employer which existed in Wetzel.
Although the above differential terms existed and the Wetzel
court used the factual differences only as reinforcement for its statement that Geduldig was not dispositive, the two plans themselves
were not as different as the court implied. The California plan was
in fact very similar to Liberty Mutual's in terms of its exclusions:
the only group denied payments, other than pregnant employees,
consisted of those individuals judicially confined to institutions for
alcoholism, drug addiction and sexual psychopathy.42 The varieties
of illness and injury that were included in the plan ranged from such
voluntary surgical procedures as hair transplants and sex-change
operations and injuries sustained in fights to such sex- or racerelated disorders as prostate disease and sickle cell anemia.4, Since
Liberty Mutual's plan also protected against the above-stated illnesses and injuries, the two plans were in fact quite similar in scope.
C.

An Omission by the Wetzel Court

Although the Third Circuit's treatment of Geduldig's applica39. 511 F.2d at 203.
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)(1975).
41. The California plan did exclude disabilities from abnormal pregnancies until the
court in Rentzer v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 366
(2d App. Dist. 1973) construed the statute to preclude only compensation for disabilities
resulting from normal pregnancies.
42. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2678 (1972).
43. See Brief for Appellees at 21, 23, 26; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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bility appeared to be a logical analysis, it was not totally comprehensive. The Wetzel court did not take issue with the meaning and
impact of footnote 204 in the Geduldig opinion, inserted as a rebuttal to the dissenting justices' position that Reed v. Reed and
Frontiero v. Richardson5 mandate a stricter standard of scrutiny in
sex discrimination actions. Viewed in a certain way, the footnote
can be seen as having impliedly invalidated the EEOC's guidelines
pertaining to pregnancy-related disabilities which in turn implies
the stripping away of the EEOC's powers granted to it by Congress.
This would be the result if the footnote's intended meaning was that
the regulation of pregnancy is not discriminatory, for if there is no
discrimination, Title VII is simply not applicable. The different
interpretations given the footnote and the inferences drawn by some
examiners4" display the significance such a discussion by the Wetzel
panel would have had.
IV.

EEOC

GUIDELINES

Did EEOC Comply with the Intent of the Civil Rights Act?

A.

In further support of its holding that Liberty Mutual had violated Title VII, the Wetzel court analyzed the guidelines beginning
with the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act:
417 U.S. at 496 n.20:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from its
list of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant,
it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sexbased classification like those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra. . .Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of
legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other
physical condition. . . . The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial
benefits of the program accrue to members of both sexes. (Emphasis added.)
45. Note 23 supra.
46. See, e.g., 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1975). Judge Widener in his dissent in Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 669 (4th Cir. 1975), opined that the footnote is dispositive
of Title VII claims, i.e., that the Geduldig decision was "written with an eye to Title VII cases
certain to come." In Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th
Cir. 1975), the court stated that footnote 20 does not say that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is never sex-based, but merely that not every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is sex-based. On the basis of Geduldig and footnote 20, the district court in
Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 F. Supp. 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), dismissed the Title VII action, but the appellate court, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1975), reversed and remanded, refusing to permit a footnote to rule an entire case.
44.
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The legislative history pertaining to the addition of the word "sex"
is indeed meager. It appears that the amendment to the Act was
offered in a tongue-in-cheek manner with the intent to undermine the
entire Act and assist in its defeat. 7

Regardless of the motivation for this addition, the Act was passed
and discrimination on the basis of sex was specifically prohibited.
While lack of legislative history does not affect the validity of prohibition of sexual discrimination, it does enhance the difficulty of
delineating congressional intent with respect to the scope and construction of Title VII. Couched in broad terms, the Title was designed to reach and "eliminate any artificial or arbitrary impediments to employment" 8 and to "strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."49
In 1972, Congress extensively amended Title VII but chose to
by-pass an opportunity to expand or limit the Act's treatment of
sex. To the Wetzel court, this indicated "congressional satisfaction
with the operation and administration of the Act." 50 Counsel for
Liberty Mutual agreed that Congress was displaying this satisfaction, but contended that the absence of substantive change militates against the court's interpretation, since "multiple federal
administrative agencies charged with the responsibility of preventing sex discrimination in employment uniformly approved the type
of insurance plan here at issue."'" The Third Circuit did not attempt
47. 511 F.2d at 204; 110 CONG. REC. 2484-85 (1964).
48. 511 F.2d at 204; H. REP. No. 914, 1964; 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2401.
49. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971).
50. 511 F.2d at 204.
51. Brief for Appellants at 12. The brief describes several conditions which existed at
the time of the 1972 amendments: the standard of legality under the Equal Pay Act (29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970)) is whether employer contributions are equal for both men and
women, not whether the benefits which accrue are greater for one sex than for the other; the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (O.F.C.C.) also uses this equal contributions test (see
Executive Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (Supp. 1974), as amended, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
for sources of O.F.C.C.'s authority); various federal agencies differentiated pregnancy under
collective bargaining agreement health insurance policies; e.g., 1973 Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers Health Benefit Plan (U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, Bureau of Retirement, Insurance and
Occupational Health, Form 41-51, Jan. 1973) and the 1973 American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Health Benefit Plan (U.S. Civ. Serv. Health, Form 41-26, Jan. 1973).
The appellant concluded that having shown no intention to erase this test in 1972,
Congress permitted Title Vu to remain unamended in this area.
Appellant chose to ignore, however, the more recently proposed guidelines which have
been published, but not yet adopted, by O.F.C.C. These state that pregnancy and pregnancyrelated disabilities must, under an employer's insurance plan or sick leave policy, be treated
as a temporary disability, subject to the same treatment as all other temporary disabilities.
38 FED. REG. 35338.
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to analyze these comments.
The court next examined the EEOC's guidelines. Congress, in
§ 2000e-12 of Title VII, authorized the EEOC to issue guidelines and
regulations in an effort to comply with the statute. Due to the
agency's expertise and ability to research the field, and the fact that
Congress vested it with issuance power, courts have usually held
that the administrative guidelines are entitled to "great deference." The prestigious status of these guidelines, however, does
have limitations. Where the application of the guidelines would be
contrary to an obvious congressional intent, the congressional intent
must prevail.53 Liberty Mutual took this position, and further
argued that the guidelines directly conflicted with the EEOC's prior
position regarding the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits."
In response to Liberty Mutual's contentions, the court referred to
its former statement that there appeared to be no specific intention
of Congress regarding this issue, other than to strike directly at the
pervasive discrimination existing in employment. The broad language of the Act, the court continued, vests the EEOC with a wide
latitude of interpretive powers provided these powers are exercised
within the plain meaning of the statute. Any radical change of position adopted by the EEOC, therefore, providing it is not contrary
to the legislative intent, is merely reflective of the conceptual transformations of our society of which an agency must keep abreast.
"This evolutionary process is a necessary function of our legal system. . .. "I'
B.

Did the Guidelines Comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act?
While the court's analysis of the homage due the guidelines
appears convincing, it overlooked a technicality which could have
been sufficiently dealt with and justified, without affecting the
Wetzel decision. The provision giving the EEOC authority to issue
guidelines contains the statement: "Regulations issued under this
section shall be in conformity with the standards and limitations of
the Administrative Procedure Act."5 6 The Administrative Procedure
52. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
53. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
54. By arguing that the guidelines were inconsistent with congressional intent, Liberty
Mutual contradicted its previous position that there was no legislative history concerning the
addition of the word "sex."
The EEOC's prior position will be discussed p. 205 infra.
55. 511 F.2d at 205.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (Supp. III, 1973).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss2/5

19761

COMMENT

Act 7 requires an agency broaching a rule to publish the proposed
regulation in the Federal Register and to give notice of the time,
place and nature of proceedings to furnish concerned parties an
opportunity to petition for or against the rule.5" The EEOC did not
follow this procedure, and consequently an argument can be made59
that since the guidelines were improperly issued, they should be
totally disregarded by the court.6 0 The Wetzel court chose not to
take issue with this argument, possibly because of the exception to
the notice requirements contained in the Administrative Procedure
Act. The applicability of the exception to this set of facts is disputable. The Act itself draws a distinction between interpretative rules
and substantive rules; the latter require notice while the former do
not." Obviously aware of this, the EEOC prefaced its 1972 guidelines with the declaration that since the material contained therein
was interpretative in nature, the notice procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act were inapplicable. However, the label given
to a rule by an administrative agency is not determinative, 2 for it
is the substance of what the agency purports to submit that is decisive. Applying the factors weighed in PharmaceuticalManufacturers Association v. Finch 3 to the guidelines pertaining to the exclusion of pregnancy, a strong argument can be made for the position
that the guidelines were indeed substantive changes and the EEOC
was obliged to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act's notice requirements.
The Wetzel court had at its disposal a variety of ways by which
it could have attacked this position. Since the guidelines do not
57. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
59. This argument was offered by Liberty Mutual.
60. In addition to the fact that public hearings were not held, there is also a question
of whether medical or financial studies concerning the necessity or possible impact of the
guidelines were conducted prior to the issuance of the guidelines. See Comment, Current
Trends In Pregnancy Benefits- 1972 E.E.O.C. Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DEPAuL L. REV.
127, 130 (1974). But see Koontz, Child Birth and Child-rearingLeave: Job Related Benefits,
17 N.Y.L.F. 480, 481 (1971).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)(1970); see 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 127, 131 (1974).
62. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942); see
also National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 95-97 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd, 393 U.S. 18 (1968).
63. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970), concluding that notice and opportunity for comment should be provided where the proposed regulation of general applicability has a substantial impact on the regulated industry. The court weighed: (1) the complexity and pervasiveness of the rules issued; (2) the drastic changes effected in existing law by the rules; (3)
the degree of retroactivity and its impact; and (4) the confusion and controversy engendered
by the practical difficulties of compliance with the new rules. 307 F. Supp. at 863. See also
Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970).
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have the force of law and are simply the agency's interpretation of
Title VII, deference can be given them only as instructive materials
despite the fact that they were not issued properly. Under the power
of judicial review, the court is then free to determine whether the
guidelines are reasonable constructions of congressional intent. The
Wetzel court, as previously mentioned, concluded that they did
display this intent.
Alternatively, the court could have discredited the contention
that the guidelines were in fact drastic substantive changes from the
EEOC's prior stance. Although the EEOC General Counsel Opinion
letters 4 in early 1966, stated that pregnancy could be treated
uniquely since the condition had no male counterpart, its present
position became established in 19695 and was later reaffirmed in
1971.6 The 1969 decision held that EEOC policy requires that pregnant employees be granted leaves of absence whether or not such
leaves were granted for illnesses.6" The 1971 decision dealt specifically with exclusion of benefits for pregnancy. Plans that included
all other non-occupational disabilities but excluded pregnancy were
held to be sexually discriminatory within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, it can be asserted that the guidelines, although different from the EEOC's position of 1966, were merely the embodiment of recent agency decisions.
This discussion suggests a course of action that the Wetzel
court should have utilized to refute an argument based on the
EEOC's noncompliance with the notice requirements. By deeming
the guidelines interpretative rather than substantive, the court
could have circumvented the necessity of such a discussion. This
determination could have been justified by the prior EEOC decisions" and by subsequent congressional acquiescence demonstrated
by its failure to amend or limit Title VII in 1972.
64. E.E.O.C. General Counsel, Opinion Letter G.C. 588-65 (Jan. 28, 1966), cited in
E.E.O.C. FIRST ANNUAL DIGEST OF LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS 5 (Jan. 1-Mar. 31, 1966).
65. Decision No. 70-360, CCH (1973) EEOC Dec. 6084 (Dec. 16, 1969).
66. Decision No. 71-1474, CCH (1973) EEOC Dec. 6221 (March 19, 1971).
67. The Commission's rationale stemmed from the assumption that since pregnancy is
a temporary disability unique to the female sex, there must be some special recognition for
absence due to pregnancy in order to provide substantial equality in employment opportunities. This policy was also expressed in E.E.O.C. General Counsel Letters of November 15,
1966 (B.N.A.F.E.P. Rep. at 401:3032). ,
68. Notes 65 and 66 supra. Prior to the issuance of the guidelines, a gradual change of
policy from the EEOC's prior position to that of the guidelines can be seen: Decision No. 71562, CCH (1973) EEOC Dec. 6184 (Dec. 4, 1970) (conditioning eligibility for maternity leave
on two years of employment violated Title VII); Decision No. 71-1474, CCH (1973) EEOC
Dec. 16221 (March 19, 1971) (program that specifically denied female employees disabled
due to pregnancy weekly benefits for 13 weeks violated Title VII): Decision No. 71-308, CCH
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V.

SHOULD PREGNANCY BE A COMPENSABLE DISABILITY?

Departing from a discussion of Title VII itself, the court went
on to consider the basic characteristics of pregnancy and whether it
should be a compensable disability. Liberty Mutual argued that
pregnancy differs from covered illnesses and injuries in terms of its
nature, severity, duration and frequency: it is neither a sickness nor
a disability; it is not influenced by a motivation to recover; it is a
voluntary condition; and it results in absences from employment
substantially longer than any actual inability to work. 9 Generally
speaking, leaves of absence and disability benefits provide the employee an opportunity to offset medical expenses and wage loss until
(s)he is again capable of returning to work. Following Liberty Mutual's logic, the pregnant employee, while incurring similar medical
expenses and wage loss, should be told that these forfeitures are
somehow different simply because she is a female and because her
pregnancy is a "natural" and "voluntary" occurrence. She should
be further informed, it was argued, that since pregnancy is a
uniquely female condition, rules and regulations regarding it cannot
be discriminatory since, having no comparable male counterpart,
all possibility of competition between the sexes is removed in this
area. These arguments have some semantic and technical substance, for no one would deny the fact that men cannot become
pregnant. Title VII and the EEOC certainly do not attempt to refute
the idea that some groups have certain unique characteristics. Title
VII and the guidelines, however, are aimed at the heart of discrimination, for they prohibit sex-based assumptions and stereotypes of
comparative employment characteristics of women.7 0
The voluntariness defense is illustrative in this regard, for employers "assume" that all pregnancies are voluntary. This "assumption" runs contrary to today's trend toward increased numbers of
abortions, religious prohibitions against contraceptives and abortions, and the fact that there is presently no means of contraception,
short of surgery, that is 100 percent effective. It also ignores the
mandate to consider individuals as individuals. 7 Even if one were
to assume that voluntariness was a valid presupposition, what is the
(1973) EEOC Dec. 1 6170 (Sept. 17, 1970) (in absence of showing that denial of leaves of
absence was a business necessity, employer's maintenance of the policy and discharge of
employee in sixth month was a violation of Title VII).
69. Brief for Appellant at 18.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(i)(1975).
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii)(1975): "The principle of nondiscrimination requires
that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of
any characteristics generally attributed to the group."
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justification for plans, like Liberty Mutual's, which include other
voluntary disabilities such as cosmetic surgery and hair transplants? The voluntariness argument clearly appears to be directed
at the pregnant woman unless it can be said that pregnancy is
similar to the other excluded disabilities, namely attempted suicides and injuries resulting from war-related activities.
An explanation is also wanting for plans, again like Liberty
Mutual's, which provide compensation for disabilities resulting
from voluntary activities such as sports events, or uniquely malerelated disabilities such as prostatectomies, race-linked diseases
such as sickle-cell anemia, and illnesses whose incidence among
males is predominant such as gout.7" Can it be seriously argued that
a plan excluding sickle-cell anemia from coverage would be upheld
as justifiable or non-discriminatory? The Wetzel court specifically
thought not by stating, "We believe that pregnancy should be
treated as any other temporary disability."73 The Commission, too,
feels that while pregnancy may not be a disability or a sickness, it
should be treated as such for job-related purposes since the financial
results between it and other temporary disabilities are sufficiently
similar.74 The EEOC does not demand that companies extensively
expand their plans but simply requires that they treat pregnancy as
other temporary disabilities.75
Inherent in the policies that now exist, lies an assumption that
a pregnant woman is incapable of working for certain periods of time
before and after childbirth. Such policies ignore individual circumstances and characteristics, along with the woman's actual physical
condition. As an example, the woman who brought suit in Seaman
v. Spring Lake Park Independent School District No. 1617 taught
school up until the day before delivery and resumed her job responsibilities fifteen working days later. Plans assuming inability to
work for extended periods, then, treat similarly situated persons,
i.e., employees, differently on the basis of sex, for only women can
become pregnant. "[W]omen, to be treated without discrimina72. Ratio of males to females is 19 to 1. Merch Manual (10th ed. 1961).
73. 511 F.2d at 206.
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b)(1975); see note 6 supra.
75. But see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c)(1975) where termination caused by an employment
policy having insufficient or no leave violates the Act if it has a disparate effect on one sex
and is not justified by business necessity. There is no definition of a "sufficient" leave within
the guidelines. This creates the possibility that an employer may be required to provide such
a plan.
76. 387 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Minn. 1974) holding that treating pregnancy-related disabilities differently from other kinds of disabilities with respect to eligibility for sick pay does not
constitute discrimination under the due process or equal protection clauses.
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tion, must be permitted to be women,"" and this means the right
to be women without having to bear the burden of disparate employment wages and fringe benefits.
Liberty Mutual also raised the defense of cost, i.e., that the
company had a legitimate interest in maintaining the financial integrity of its plan. The court again respected the EEOC's guidelines718 and refused to consider cost a justifiable defense. Even the
exemption granted to bona fide occupational qualifications in the
guidelines79 appears, by a reading of the section and by judicial
interpretation, 0 to apply only to the hiring of employees and not to
benefits provided. The threat of devastating or increasing cost, the
very defense that was upheld in Geduldig, was held to be immaterial
by the Wetzel court.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's treatment of this issue will be interesting
to witness, for it must keep in mind not only the very definite trend
of judicial adjudications and the specific interpretation rendered by
the EEOC's own decisions and guidelines, but also the realities of
modern day society. Past holdings"' of the Court itself lean toward
an affirmance of the Wetzel conclusion, and its ruling in Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur,2 demonstrated that more than a
cursory glance will be afforded regulations concerning pregnancy.
Affirmance, though, would mean more than concurrence with these
authorities for it could translate into a theoretical retreat from its
Geduldig position.
When Congress enacted Title VII and created the EEOC, that
body, elected as representative of the people, put on record the fact
that discrimination in employment, be it against race, religion, national origin or sex, no longer has a place and will not be tolerated
in American society. To enforce this view, the EEOC was given the
power to establish guidelines and set forth regulations to carry out
the intentions of Congress. Should the Supreme Court reverse the
Wetzel ruling, it may very well simultaneously strip the EEOC of
77. Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 721-22.
78. 511 F.2d at 204.
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2)(1975).
80. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Bowe v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228 (5th Cir. 1969).
81. See cases cited note 23 supra.
82. 414 U.S. 632 (1974) holding that arbitrary termination dates for pregnant employees
have no valid relationship to the state's interest and therefore violate the due process clause.
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its viability and powers as an administrative agency. A reversal
could begin a rule of law that totally ignores and subordinates the
economic needs of pregnant women. In the international picture,
the United States presently stands as one of a decreasing number
of countries throughout the world which makes no provision to compensate women who must temporarily cease employment because of
pregnancy." '
While reversal may destroy the financial stability of pregnant
employees, affirmance, too, could take its toll. Without legislation
requiring private employers to provide disability plans, companies
could, in an effort to avoid "prohibitive" costs, eliminate these
plans altogether. While this is a possibility, it does not seem to be
a realistic probability for company health and insurance plans have
developed into such an integrated part of the total employment
package that elimination of these plans could not only result in
possible economic depression for those who become ill or disabled,
but it could also affect the morale of company employees.
The declaration from Congress, made nearly twelve years ago,
a matter which concerns over one half of the United States' population, will soon be tested and considered by the United States Supreme Court. For all practical purposes, the decision will be the
final word, until legislation states differently, on whether a woman
must actually choose between motherhood and career opportunities
or whether she will be given the necessary encouragement to contribute equally with her -male counterpart.
Mary H. Egger
83.

United States Dep't of Labor, Int'l Rep. No. 6, WOMEN IN THE WORLD TODAY:
92 COUNTRIES (1963). This report indicates that 72
countries provide at least six weeks of paid leave for maternity purposes; see Conlin, Equal
Protection vs. Equal Rights Amendment-Where Are We Now?, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 304,
n.366 (1975).
MATERNITY PROTECTION AND BENEFITS IN
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